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PRE F ACE 
The Agricultural Economics Research Unit has, over the 
last three years, published a number of studies relating to 
hill country development in New Zealand. A further stage 
in this continuing investigation of development economics, was 
inititated with a research project in the Taranaki area on 
which this publication reports. 
The project commenced in December 1966 when it was 
proposed that fifteen farm development programmes should be 
investigated in detail, and that fairly reliable estimates 
of the level of profitability in such steep hill country would 
be determined. However, downward changes in coarse wool 
prices rendered most of the early field work on the project 
obsolete, as the farmers concerned rapidly adjusted their 
development plans to the new situation. 
The aims of the project were therefore re-cast in terms 
of the changing situation and it was decided to concentrate 
attention on the adjustment process itself. Time permitted 
four of the original farms to be revisited in October 1967, 
and this report is mainly based on this latter work. The 
early field work is referred to in appropriate places, and 
is summarised at the end of the report. 
The first round of field work was undertaken by Messrs 
D.O"B. Baker, R.L. Engelbrecht, G.A. Halstead, D.B. McLeod, 
ReH. Simpson and D.R.A. Skyrme. Mr D.D. Hussey made the 
second round of visits. The research project as a whole was 
directed by R.W.M. Johnson who, as author of this report, 
naturally remains responsible for the opinions expressed 
therein. He has benefited from discussions with B.J. Ross, 
H.Jo Plunkett and D.D. Hussey. 
Particular thanks q';l;'§ due to the 15 farmers who readily 
co-operated with the field workers at a busy time of year; 
Mr C. Christie of the Department of Agriculture, Stratford, 
Mr B. Parker, Department of Agriculture, New Plymouth; and 
Messrs Molesworth and Lithgow of the Farmers' Co-operative, 
Stratford. 
Lincoln College, 
March 1968 
B.P. Philpott 
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THE IMPACT OF FALLING PRICES ON 
TARANAKI HILL COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT 
Ie THE AIMS OF THE PROJECT 
Present agricultural policy in New Zealand dates from 
1964, when the Agricultural Development Conference laid down 
targets for the level of expansion to be reached in 1972/73. 
In particular, it was envisaged that the national livestock 
target would require that livestock numbers increase by 3.5 
per cent per year. In view of the already fairly highly 
developed state of much of the easy land in the Dominion, it 
was envisaged that the main areas for livestock development 
would be the more hilly regions of both Islands. The advent 
of the aeroplane for spreading fertiliser, especialty, had 
brought this type of land within the realm of what was both 
technically and economically possible. In formulating this 
project it was thought that the economic limits of hill 
country development could well be reached in the steeper 
hill country of Taranaki, where access was poor, the need 
for fertiliser fair~y high, and bush or second growth cover 
had to be removed. In 1966 it was not foreseen, of course, 
that the moderately favourable product prices then prevailing 
would not last. much longer. 
The project started in November, 1966. A team of 
graduate students were employed to investigate closely some 
10-15 actual farm development programmes, either already 
started or about to be start.ed. After close examination 
of the property itself, the research teaI1'l: (usually working 
in pairs) prepared detailed budgets of projected income and 
expenditure for the relevant period until some well-defined 
target objective, like four ewe equivalents per acre carried 
over the whole farm, was reached. These budgets then gave 
the actual or projected st.reams of total revenue, total 
expenditure, net revenue and other totals for each year of 
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the development programme. The final step in the analysis 
was to then analyse these streams by present worth analysis 
to measure the rate of profitability on each farm and in the 
area as a whole. At the existing levels of costs and prices, 
there would then be a fairly representative indication of 
the worthwhileness of this particular aspect of the national 
agricultural development programme. 
The actual field work to achieve these objectives was 
carried out in November and December, 1966, and the analysis 
of results was completed by March 1967. In the meantime, 
wool prices had fallen a great deal further from the 36 pence 
level assumed in most of the budgets, and pressure of other 
work kept the author from completing a final report. As 
time passed it was clear that a re-appraisal was needed of 
the whole situation, so a further field investigation was 
organised in October 1967, and the earlier results modified 
to meet the new situation found. 
One of the disadvantages of the budget method used in 
the first part of the survey, is that the results are not 
easily adapted to changing product prices. The development 
programme for a farm is geared to available finance which 
includes surpluses generated by the development programme 
itself. Thus the rate of development depends largely on 
the income foregone by the farmer himself as well as on the 
availability of outside finance. Lower wool prices obviously 
lower this rate of development, and hence the correct action 
to follow a product price change is to re-calculate the whole 
programme afresh. This was not in fact attempted for all 
the 15 farms previously visited, as 1967 was clearly a period 
of transition when farmers waited to make up their minds whether 
to continue or not. Instead, it was decided to discuss the 
problems of this transition period by reference to four of 
the properties for which actual details were known. 
On the typical farm, the programme of development 
involves bush clearing, burning, over-sowing and top-dressing, 
new fencing and often new access routes. On a property of 
500-750 acres, only about 50 acres can be treated in this way 
in one year. The cost of such development work can reach 
$50-$60 per acre, and presents a severe financial strain on 
the owner. In addition to the actual development work, the 
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stock to g-raze the new grass have to be either purchased at 
'still more cash cost. from outside sources I or retained from 
potential slaughter stock, thus reducing farm income in the 
very period when extra ·finance is required. In this kind 
of situation, the farmer needs outside help either by way of 
accommodation from. his bank or stock firm, or by way of a 
mortgaged loan from the Stat.e Advances Corporation. 
A further met.hod of development is to intensify prod-
uction on existing developed past:ures. In the Taranaki 
situation this involves higher rates of fertiliser application 
and heavier stocking rat.es of sheep and cattle. The cost of 
this method of development is probably not as high as in 
developing from bush or manuka scrub, but there is the same 
cycle of higher costs and lower immediate stock surpluses, 
until the new stocking rate potential is reached. 
The developing farm can be characterised, therefore, 
by this commitment of resources in the present to attain some 
pot.ential level of farm income and personal income in the 
future. If prices fall short of those expected, the farmer 
is in a highly vulnerable positionoFirstly, the flow of 
revenue which helps f,tnance the development programme is 
reduced; and secondly the farmer is probably carrying a 
load of debt which is related to his target carrying capacity 
and income, but which is far beyond his resources to finance 
in mid-development 0 
'I'he react.ions of farmers to these condi t.ions vary. In 
the case studies present.ed lat.er, the farmers with steady 
intensification programmes on already developed farms, requiring 
mainly more fertiliser and st.ock, are able to continue their 
expansion programmes 0 Heavy capital expenditure is avoided, 
and net income is increased to. a higher level than it would be 
wi thout furt.her development 0 Examina tion of their budgeted 
incomes and expendi t.ure showed that the modified expansion 
programmes initiated in 1967 were just as profitable as the 
more ambit~ious programmes drawn up in 1966 (at. 1966 prices) . 
At t.he same time, the farmer would have t~o work harder than 
before. In general, the cheapest. form of development is 
adding more s t.ock to already developed farms. Apparen tly I 
the present expansion of knowledge of heavy stocking, handling 
and general management:, fa'v'Ours t.his form of development at all 
levels of prices 0 
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The examination of the case studies with heavy programmes 
of bush clearing, scrub cutting, burning, oversowing and stock-
ing, did not reveal such a happy situation. At 1966 prices, 
the development programmes drawn up were profitable, and lending 
institutions were prepared to provide finance. But in 1967 
the farmers found that they had to reduce all expenditure to a 
minimum and consolidate the gains they had achieved so far. 
Fertiliser had to be cut back to that amount that would just 
provide enough growth for stock, and all capital improvements 
delayed until things improved. In this way, these farmers 
could just pay the interest on borrowed money and gain enough 
income to live on. Their properties, of course, have not 
reached the potential which is: possible under present day 
knowledge. 
It is not clear in these cases whether devaluation has 
made sufficient difference to make this type of development 
economic; at the moment it is doubtful if the nation should 
commit further resources to encouraging development of this 
class of country, unless the premium on foreign exchange alters 
the whole system of weights used in "valuing" such exportable 
products. The individual farmers in these areas who have 
already committed themselves to development programmes will 
probably require some help in consolidating their position, 
or in attaining the more economic level of production. 
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IIo HILL COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT IN TARANAKI 
The Taranaki province of New Zealand is of course more 
famous for its dairy farms than its sheep farms. The dairying 
area of the province does in fact occupy the coastal plain and 
immediat.e environs of Mt Egmont. To the east, the coastal 
volcanic plain gives way to a heavily dissected peneplain of 
about 1000" alt.itude. Rainfall varies from 60" to 100" per 
annum, and the natural cover of the area was sub-tropical forest. 
Since the late nineties, the forest has been slowly cleared from 
the west and the area opened up for farming. Dairy farming has 
continued on t.he valley floors and easy foothills,but as the 
hill country itself was tackled the economy was based on sheep. 
The underlying geological strata of the area consists of 
young sedimentary rocks, and these give rise to the typical 
poorly consolidated sandstones and grey mUdstones. The sand-
stones are relatively stable, in spite of the high rainfall of 
the region, but the mUdstones or "papa" have a tendency to 
slip. Over the whole area there is an overlying layer of 
volcanic ash deposited from Mt Egmont and from the centre of 
the North Island. It is estimated that there are some 1,113,000 
acres of this type of land in the Taranaki land district, some 
two thirds of it sandstone, and one third mudstone.* 
During the period from 1900 to 1930, large areas of this 
broken and heavily forested country were taken up by settlers. 
The felling of t.he forest, burning and the sowing of English 
grasses was the typical pattern of occupation. For a period, 
the initi.al fertility of the ash burn allowed good pastures to 
develop, but in the absence of fertiliser, a slow deterioration 
usually set in thereafter. A.s the pastures thinned less stock 
could be carried, and as less stock was carried, the lower was 
the rate of return of organic soil nutrients. 
In addition, there was a t.endency for the natural cover 
to reassert itself usually in the form of manuka scrub. If 
left. unchecked, the manuka was t.he firs·t stage of the success-
ion back to sub-t.ropical foresto 
* Ao Wright, '"The Potential of Taranaki Hill Country", Discuss-
ion Paper No.31, Department of Agric.Economics and Farm 
Management, Massey University, 1965. 
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On top of these natura~ problems facing the settlers, 
the world depression of the 1930's brought disastrous prices 
for the stock and wool they produced. In particular, many 
settlers could not service the debts they had built up in 
opening up their farms, and were unable to improve their farms 
in the face of the declining fertility of the pastures. 
Slowly but surely, the properties passed into the hands of 
the mortgagees and then were abandoned. In the thirties and 
forties the settlement frontier thus retreated, and the early 
efforts of the first settlers gradually disappeared under the 
rising mantle of the manuka bushes. Farms survived in the 
valley floors, near centres of communications, and where dairy 
cows could be used to supplement incomes. Even in the 1960 l s 
there are roads. which lead nowhere, and concrete bridges 
standing isolated and alone in a sea of bush. 
The development problem in the 1960 l s stems from this 
historical pattern of settlement. There has not been a whole-
sale re-occupation of these reverted areas. Instead, existing 
farmers, or new entrants who have taken over the existing home-
steads and farmlets, have been concentrating on enlarging the 
carrying capacity of their individual units. For some, this 
means consolidating a life-long battle of cutting manuka, by 
using more fertiliser and more stock. For others, it means 
rolling back the invasion of manuka once again, burning and 
re-sowing and then consolidating immediately with moderately 
heavy applications of phosphatic fertiliser. 
With the high rainfall of the region, the relative freedom 
from erosion, especially in the sandstone country, and the new 
level of soil fertility that can be achieved, the carrying 
capacity of this hill country can be brought to 4-5 ewe 
equivalents per acre. At some maintenance level of fertiliser 
application, possibly 2 cwt per annum, it is expected that 
this carrying capacity of sheep and cattle can now be maintained 
indefinitely, and that pasture competition will of itself 
prevent further regeneration of second growth species. 
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IIIe THE PRICE PROBLEM 
From the point of view of analysing farm development, 
farm gate prices are most. relevant. Over the period analysed 
here, the market value of New Zealand wool particularly, has 
been disguised by the support price activities of the New 
Zealand Wool Commission and then by the devaluation of the 
N.Z .. dollar. These changes need to be understood in explaining 
payout prices at a particular point in time, as it is the end 
result which is relevant to the valuation of products in the 
development bUdgets. 
Farm prices are also important in that their levels 
affect the confidence of farmers. In the present analysis 
the Wanganui wool sales are the single most important indicator. 
The attached graph shows recent trends in wool auction 
prices at the Wanganui sales, the appropriate centre for the 
Taranaki district. The upper line shows the auction or support 
price for medium crossbred fleece wool, 46/50's, good average 
quality (114B). The lower line shows the average price 
received for greasy wool at each sale. For farm budgeting 
purposes, the average greasy price is the most relevant. 
After a particularly buoyant period in 1963/64, when 
greasy prices averaged about 55 pence per lb., there was a 
slow decline in unit values through 1964, 1965 and 1966. 
Toward the end of 1966 when field work started on this project, 
greasy prices were about 37 pence per lb., although the sale 
on the 30th November 1966, was lower at 33.7 pence. For most 
of the budgets described in section VI of this report, either 
36 pence or 37 pence was used, depending on previous prices 
each individual farmer had received for his wool. Farmers 
were confident they could operate within this price level. 
Many development programmes were initiated in this area in 
the mid sixties. 
The Wool Commission first supported the market in 
Wanganui on November 1st 1966, when 6.4 per cent of the 
offering was passed to the Commission. Although the basis 
of support up to July 1st 1967 was 36 pence per lb. over the 
whole New Zealand clip, the average auction price at Wanganui 
a 
steadied out at about 31 pence per lb. greasy, with a high 
proportion of the wool passing to the Commission. From 
July 1st to October 13th the floor price was lowered to 
30 pence on an all New Zealand basis - 25 cents from July 10th. 
In this period, the Wanganui auction on August 3rd averaged 
22.87 cents. Then from October 18th to November 15th the 
Wool Commission changed to a price-supplementation policy plus 
a floor price of 16.25 cents. Growers had their auction 
prices supplemented to 25 cents, and the market was supported 
at the much lower level of 16.25 cents. In this period, the 
average Wanganui auction price f?r greasy wool fell to 17.73 
cents. The actual payout received by Wanganui farmers was 
possibly 21-22 cents. 
with devaluation on November 22nd wool auction prices 
rose sufficiently to almost eliminate the need for supplement-
ation and market support. All New Zealand auction prices rose 
f'rom 20.36 cents before devaluation to 24.17 cents after devaluat-
ion.* At the end of November, the Wanganui auctions averaged 
21.60 cents. In January, 1968, the Wanganui auction price 
softened slightly to 19.54 cents~ nevertheless the real amount 
received by growers was probably stable around 21-22 cents for 
the whole period from October 18th onwards. The course of the 
Wool Commission activities in the Wanganui auctions are shown 
in the following table: 
Date Average Price Passed to Wool Commission 
Pence Cents Amount Per Cent of Offering 
1.11.66 37.1 121 bales 604 
30.11.66 33.7 1,571 " 7.5 
13.1.67 32.5 16,113 " 57.5 
10.2.67 31.7 13,226 " 47.0 
10.4.67 30.9 14;554 " 67.5 
31.5.67 30.3 15.900 " 84.5 
3.8.67 22.9 1,671 " 22.5 
31.10.67 17.7 416 " 2.4 
27.11.67 21.6 No detail 
12.1.68 19.5 "Occasional Supporting Bids" 
The full effects of these price changes on particular 
farm situations are discussed below in Section v. 
* New Zealand Wool Commission, News sheet dated Jan.9th, 1968. 
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IVe THE MEASUREMENT OF RETURNS ON DEVELOPMENT 
Before taking up the discussion of the case studies, 
it is necessary to write a brief introduction to the 
measures of profitability employed. 
The general objective of the investigation is to assess 
the worthwhileness of further development of steep hill 
country in Taranaki. A broad cross-section of farms was 
to be investigated to give a representative view - this is 
the national viewpoint. At the same time, the individual 
farmer wishes to know how he stands; this is the farmer's 
viewpoint. 
The National Viewpoint 
Since the overall objective is to contribu-te to the 
Agricultural Development Conference expansion programme, 
the first requirement of the analysis is to express the 
volume of exportable products produced by further development 
in terms of their extra cost to the country. This can be 
expressed in the following ratio: 
$ worth of exportable products 
$ worth of resources used 
The ratio can be calculated for individual farm develop-
ment programmes, or aggregated over a group of farms, or over 
a whole region. The answers to the calculation could express 
the return per $ value of resources used from all,sectors 
of the economy, or the return per $ of resources used by the 
farmer. 
Since development programmes are spread over quite a 
few years, an adjustment to the above simple ratio is required 
in practice. This is done by taking the present worth of each 
set of data in the ratio. The present worth is the discounted 
value of a series of amounts in the future brought back to the 
present. The present worth of $105 in a year's time is $100 
now at 5 per cent discount rate. This procedure brings 
different patterns in the build-up of returns and costs to 
a common standard. 
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The ratio may thus be summarised as follows: 
Present worth of all "extra" lamb, wool and hides etc. 
Present worth of all extra costs of fertj,liser and running expenses etc 
The Farmer's Viewpoint 
While the farmer is interested to know his particular 
contribution to the national objectives, he also has a more 
specialised interest in his own financial return. As many 
New Zealand farmers are non-corporate owner-occupiers, they 
are liable to income tax on the extra assessable income generated 
by the development programme. It is therefore important to 
add tax paid to the list of commitments of the individual 
farmer. The ratio then expresses the expected returns per $ 
of outgoings involved for each farmer. The usual adjustments 
are then made to each account for different time patterns and 
to bring the two sides to a single measure. If the ratio is 
less than unity, the programme is not worthwhile. The degree 
of profitability is measured by the amount the ratio rises 
above unity. 
In some cases it is useful to express the result as 
an internal rate of return. This expresses the rate of 
return on capital and current expenses as a simple percentage. 
If the chosen discount rate is 7 per cent, and the ratio gives 
a result of exactly unity, then the internal rate of return is 
also 7 per cent. As the ratio rises above unity, the internal 
rate of return gives an appropriate indication of the profit-
ability for each individual situation. 
Each case study is first looked at 
view of the plan drawn up in late 1966. 
to as the 1966 plan at 1966 prices. The 
plan assesses whether typical development 
worthwhile at this price level. 
from the point of 
This is referred 
evaluation of this 
programmes are 
The impact of 1967 price levels is then reviewed in 
each case. structural changes in the plan are considered 
and the reasons for making them. 
The next step is to look at the decline in revenue that 
has taken place and to assess the profitability of development 
from this point of view. 
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Finally, the economics of further developmen,t attoday's 
prices is considered. This is referred to as the 1967 plan 
at 1967 prices. The evaluation of this plan assesses whether 
further development is worthwhile at 1967 price levels. 
Vo THE CASE STUDIES 
Case 1 This farm of about 500 acres is situated.on flat 
and moderately hilly country and is fully cleared 
of bush and scrub. It is a one man farm with a breeding 
flock of 900 ewes and 70 cows. Carrying capacity was 3.9 
ewe equivalents per acre. with more intensive management 
practices, the 1966 development plan raised this carrying 
capacity to 6.25 ewe equivalents per acre by 1970/71. 
To achieve this increase, fertiliser application was 
increased from 50 tons per year (2 cwt/acre) in 1966/67 to 
92 tons (3.7 cwt/acre) in the final year and thereafter. 
Capital·expenditure was planned for access improvements, 
an airstrip and a fertiliser bin ($3800). Other physical 
components of the plan were 120 chains of fencing, 50 acres 
of oversowing, 50 acres of pole planting, and the clearing, 
levelling and resowing of 26 acres of flats near the home-
stead. A loan of $8430 from the State Advances Corporation 
would have been required, spread over the years 1966/67, 
1967/68 and 1968/69. 
These improvements were incorporated in a detailed 
development plan, complete with budgets for income and expend-
iture for each year up to 1970/71. The budget for 1970/71 
was based on stable livestock numbers, and maintenance 
estimates of expenditure. 
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Prices of products were as follows: 
Wool 32 cents per lb. 
Store lambs $4.00 per head 
Cull ewes $3.50 per head 
Weaner heifers $34.00 per head 
Weaner steers $44.00 per head 
The financial results were as follows: 
(1966 plan at 1966 prices) 
Year 
--
Total Revenue * Total Expendi tura .. 
Pre-development 
1966/67 
1967/68 
1968/69 
1969/70 
Post-development 
$11,910 
10,620 
12,380 
14,940 
17,750 
21,500 
$ 5,900 
8,720 
12,430 
10,750 
11,080 
10,122 
Tax 
$1,080 
140 
490 
1,100 
1,660 
4,000 
At a 7 per cent interest rate the present worth of 
extra revenue above the pre-development level was $110,651 -
this large sum assumes that $9,590 (the difference between 
the pre-development and post-development revenue) can be 
obtained for a long time after 1971. On the same basis, 
the extra expenditure on goods and services is $62,263. 
The return per $ of exp~nditure is therefore $1.78 for the 
plan as a whole. The internal rate of return for the plan 
is 27.0 per cent. 
If the tax paid by the farmer is taken into account, 
the programme is still very worthwhile. The present worth 
of extra revenue is $110,651 as before, with outgoings of 
$92,374. This gives a return of $1.20 per $ of payments 
involved for the farmer. The internal rate of return is 
17.7 per cent. 
In summary, at 1966 prices this plan was highly 
worthwhile to the country, and to the farmer. 
* This is capit.al and current expenditure - not tax allow-
able expenditure and excludes interest and depreciation. 
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The 1967 Situation 
The plan was next revised in the light of 1967 prices* 
for wool. The following prices were used in the analysis: 
Wool 20 cents per lb. 
Store lambs $ 2.50 per head 
Cull ewes $ 2.80 per head 
Weaner heifers $34.00 per head 
Weaner steers $44.00 per head 
The farmer believed that the same stock targets could 
be achieved, while cutting back on certain improvements. 
$7,000 of the State Advances loan had already been spent. 
Fertiliser was reduced to 2~ cwt per acre during the develop-
ment period and stabilised at 2% cwt. Wages of management 
were reduced from $1,700 to $1,500, but increased to $1,800 
at the conclusion of the plan.-Extra labour help was 
omitted. In 1968/69, 50 chains of track formation were 
deleted from the plan, plus the necessary fencing off due 
to be carried out in the following year. Extensions to 
the woolshed were not budgeted for. The budgets were then 
recalculated for the same years as before. Two different 
methods of analysis are followed: 
(a) Trends in actual costs and returns. 
(b) Profita.bility of the 1967 plan at 1967 prices. 
(a) The results of 1965/66 and 1966/67 are past and 
cannot be altered. But for the remaining four years of 
the programme the development proposals have been modified 
in the light of falling wool prices. If the six years of 
results are considered together, it is possible to estimate 
the value of extra products produced at the prices it is now 
thought they will fetch. 
* The farmer concerned here has pointed out to us that 
the prices for store la.mbs and cull ewes have been 
somewhat better in 1967/68 than was anticipated in 
October 1967. 
15 
Extra revenue generated on the farm will now have 
a present worth of $29.298 instead of $110,651; and the 
val~e of extra resources employed falls to $34,900 instead 
of ~62,263. The return to the nation is $0.84 per $ of 
resources used, and the internal rate of return 4.4 per cent. 
If the payments by the farmer are taken into account, 
the return to the farmer is $0.81 per $ of payments, and 
the internal rate of return is 2.7 per cent. 
In this situation, present price levels do not justify 
the levels of capital expenditure projected for 1966/67, and 
the farmer's cautious reorganisation was wholly necessary. 
(b) These results can be looked at in another way. 
If the budgets of 1965/66 and 1966/67 are recalculated at 
1967 price levels, then the whole analysis is concerned with 
the profitability of the modified development programme as if 
it were about to start now. 
The financial results were as follows: 
(1967 plan at 1967 prices) 
Year 
Pre-development 
1966/67 
1967/68 
1968/69 
1969/70 
Post-development 
Total Revenue 
$ 8 0 297 
9,593 
9,240 
11,334 
12,962 
14,980 
Total Expenditure 
$ 5,900 
8,720 
10,778 
7,438 
7,688 
8,229 
Tax 
$ 80 
260 
670 
1,480 
In this case, pre-development revenue has fallen from 
$11,910 to $8,297. Expenditure remains the same in the 
pre-development year and in 1966/67, as modifications only 
took place in 1967/68, when $10,778 was to be spent instead 
of $12,430. The following years are all modified according 
to the adjustments described earlier. 
On this basis, the return to the nation in present 
worth terms from the modified development programme is now 
$79,585 for $34,900 of expenditure, a rate of return of 
$2.28. The internal rate of return is 36.5 per cent. 
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The commitments to the tax gatherer are still fairly 
great in this case, and total outgoings of the farmer rise 
to a present worth of $50,596; a return of $1.27. The 
internal rate of return is 28.0 per cent. 
It is clear that the 
farm is highly profitable. 
results by doing without a 
amended programme for this case 
'I'he farmer will achie ve these 
number of improvements which would 
make the property easier to manage. Lower price-s have forced 
him to forego improvements in his own real standard of living, 
so as to maintain his cash income. If prices do improve in 
the future, then it is very likely that capital investment 
will take place in these labour-saving type of improvements 
as a first priority. 
The magnitude of this farmeros efforts can be gauged 
by the fact that if he worked as hard as he did in 1967, but 
enjoyed 1966 levels of prices, then the internal rate of 
return on his development programme rises from 36.5 per 
cent to 45.7 per cent. His post-tax r~te rises from 28.0 per 
cent to 28.8 per cent only! 
Case 2 The next case study farm has an area of 1,200 
acres, and is situated on moderately rolling to 
steep hill country. About 700 acres have been~eveloped. 
The farmer is managing the property on his own, and in 
1961/62 when taken over, about 950 breeding ewes and 60 
breeding cows were run. Thus the developed area was 
running approximately 2 ewe equivalents per acre at. the 
start, and the development plan aimed at both increasing 
the carrying capacity of the developed area and extending 
the area of developmento By 1970/71, it was hoped to have 
a breeding ewe flock of 2,000, and 125 breeding cows. 
It should be noted that this particular development 
plan was already well under way when the farmer was visited 
in late 1966. The material presented here mainly documents 
this development programme, and adds 3 further years of 
projected development. 
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The main items in the development programme were 720 
chains of fencing, 330 acres of scrub-cutting, 640 acres 
of over-sowing, and increasing the rate of fertili'ser 
application from 30 tons per year to 144 tons per year. 
Most of this programme was financed by a loan from the 
state Advances Corporation. By 1966/67 ewe numbers were 
up to 1,770 and cow numbers were up to 107. 
In preparing the details of income and expenditure, 
average prices for two periods for surplus stock and wool 
were used. 
1961-1965 
1966-1969 
Store lambs Cull ewes 
$3.50 
4.00 
$2.50 
3.50 
Wool 
--
29c. 
29c. 
The financial analysis was as follows: 
(1966 plan at prices stated) 
steers 
$60.00 
80.00 
Year Total Revenue Total E~enditure Tax 
Pre-development $ 7,172 $ 4,562 
1961/62 6,246 8,126 
1962/63 7,574 7,672 
1963/64 7,496 13,714 
1964/65 9,004 13,444 
1965/66 12,552 9,272 
1966/67 15,406 17,684 
1967/68 15,306 15,346 
1968/69 17,764 12,986 
Post-development 22,272 12,064 
The return to the nation is as follows: 
$147,246 = 
106,385 1.38 
$ 180 
180 
700 
2,900 
The internal rate of return is 12.7 per cent. After 
taking into account the tax position, the return to the 
farmer is as follows: 
$~47g246 = 1.15 
128,445 
The internal rate of return is 11.5 per cent. 
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In general, the development plan for this property at 
1966 price levels was a good proposition both for the nation 
and for the farmer. 
The 1967 Situation 
The vulnerability of this farmer to price changes is 
perhaps best illustrated by reference to the method of 
financing the last four years of the 1966 development plan. 
1966L67 1967L68 1968L69 Post-dev. 
Total Allowable Expenditure $13,180 $14,106 $14,278 $13,356 
Capital Expenditure 6,500 2,900 400 
Tax 100 180 700 2,900 
Obligatory Principal 920 920 
Personal 1!800 1!800 1!800 1,800 
-21,580 -18,986 -18,098 -18,976 
Cash Income +15,406 +15,306 +17,764 +22,272 
Borrowing - 6,174 - 3,680 334 + 3,296 
The State Advances Corporation were to establish the 
amount of the total development loan at the end of the 1967/68 
season, and then convert it into a table mortgage. 
Thus in the early part of 1967, the farmer was just 
completing a heavy programme of capital development, and had 
to decide whether to continue the next year1s programme. In 
the face of falling revenue, more borrowing in 1967/68 than 
$3,680 would have been required. The prospect was that the 
new levels of wool prices were semi-permanent so that the cash 
income shown above could not be expected in subsequent years 
either. It can be estimated that if the physical levels of 
sales projected for 1967/68 were sold at actual 1967/68 prices, 
gross revenue would have fallen from $15,306 to $11,276 - a 
fall-back of $4,100. The farmer decided not to increase his 
debt any further and to stabilise his carrying capacity at the 
level he had reached in 1967. 
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This decision enabled gross returns to be increased 
slightly by the sale of breeding replacements no longer 
needed. Wool is valued at 20 cents, store lambs $2.80, 
and cull ewes $2.50. 
1967i68 Budget 1967i68 Actual 
Cattle sold no. 56 72 
value $2,808 $3,510 
Sheep sold no. 1,062 1,335 
value $4,294 $3,650 
'Wool sold 27,990 Ibs. 25,600 
value $8,180 $5, 120 
The capital development programme was cut back by 
reducing fertiliser from 126 tons projected to 90 tons 
(2~ cwt over 720 acres), delaying house and garage improve-
ments and the construction of a whare, and delaying 125 
chains of fencing. The delay in the fertiliser and fencing 
programmes meant that the area of land over-sown in 1966 
could not be properly consolidated. In 1968/69, a further 
125 chains of fencing would be put off plus a projected 
set of cattle yards. 
Even with these adjustments, the expected budget 
for 1967/68 does not quite balance. 
Total revenue expected is: 
Cattle sales 
Sheep sales 
Wool sales 
Miscellaneous 
Total cash expenditure: 
$3,510 
3,650 
5,120 
45 
12,325 
Tax allowable expenditure $6,845 
(excluding interest & depn.) 
Capital development 
Interest 
.P:;:r:th'4,eipa 1 
Personal 
Taxation 
Depreciation 
Balance: 
3,526 
1,200 
1,200 
60 
700 
13,531 
-1,206 
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Before depreciation, there-will still remain a cash 
deficit of $506. As the season develops, there-maybe 
sufficient saving on farm expenses to meet the deficit, 
and if present trends in wool prices continue at least 
2 cents per lb. extra can be expected. This would be 
worth an extra $51b!' 
Farm Profitability 1960-68 
If this farmer must suspend development at present 
price levels, then it is possible to assess the profit-
abi 1 i ty 0 f deve lopmen t for the las t \ei'gh t years by as s uming 
1967/68 levels of prices and production will continue for 
some time. 
The actual levels of revenue and expenditure, as 
previously defined, were as follows: 
1960/61 
1961/62 
1962/63 
1963/64 
1964/65 
1965/66 
1966/67 
1967/68 
Total Revenue 
$ 7,172 
6,246 
7,574 
7,496 
9,004 
12,552 
15,406 
12,325 
Total Expenditure 
$ 4,562 
8,126 
7,672 
13,714 
13,444 
9,272 
17,684 
7,545 
Tax 
$180 
60 
If the 1967/68 level of total revenue now continues 
in the future, the present worth of all extra revenue is 
$59,504, and that of extra expenditure is $60,771, giving 
a return of $0.98 per $ of resources used. The internal 
rate of return is 6.7 per cent. It is clear that the 
programme of development so far is just about going to pay 
for itself at 7 per cent interest rates. Any further fall 
in prices would make the plan less profitable. 
As the tax paid in 1967/68 is actually smaller than 
in 1960/61, the extra payments to be met by the farmer are 
also smaller. The present value of extra revenues is still 
$59,504, but that of payments by the farmer is :$58,771, 
giving a return of $1.01 per $ of payment. The internal 
rate of return is 7.2 per cent. 
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In this case, the response of the farmer to falling 
prices has been to suspend his development plan. He 
particularly did not want to increase his debt any furtherr 
He is fortunate that the major improvement to his woolshed 
was already complete, and his management problems will only 
be more difficult where fencing was incomplete and cattle 
yards unfinished. In the future, he will have to work 
harder than planned as he has cancelled his plans for providing 
accommodation for extra labour. 
The main impact of falling prices has been to reduce 
his standarq of living in the future as the potential 
development level of income will not now be reached unless 
prices improve. 
Case 3 This farm is about 400 acres, over half of which 
is steep hill country_ Prior to 1966, the scrub 
areas on the farm had been cut, burnt and over-sown by hand. 
Good pastures had not yet developed. Nevertheless, the 
farmer had a flock of about 1,000 breeding ewes and 50 
breeding cows. Carrying capacity was already 4.3 ewe 
equivalents per acre. 
Like most farmers in the area, the owner managed the 
property on his own. He wanted to improve the farm further 
and to better his income position. Although steep, it was 
clear that a programme of fertiliser application, sub-division 
and heavier stocking, had considerable potential. Fertiliser 
application increased from 3.3 cwt per acre to 4.25 cwt per 
acre. With the farmer's co-operation, the research team 
therefore drew up a plan for further sheep expansion alone T 
taking breeding ewes to'l,900, and total ewe equivalents to 
2,660, or 6.6 per acre, by 1972/73. The programme was 
drawn up so that the rate of expansion could be financed out 
of revenue. 
Price assumptions: 
Wether lambs 
Ewe lambs 
Two-tooth ewes 
Cull ewes 
Weaner steers 
Cull cows 
Wool 
Financial results: 
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$4.00 
6.00 
8.50 
6.50 
44.00 
50.00 
.31 
(1966 plan at 1966 prices) 
Year Total Revenue Total 
Pre-consolidation $12,940 
1967/68 12,960 
1968/69 13,660 
1969/70 15,920 
1970/71 17,380 
1971/72 17,620 
Post consolidation 19,282 
Return to the nation: 
$74,402 
= 2.18 34,125 
Internal rate of return = 46.9 per cent. 
EXEenditure 
$5,260 
7,340 
7,570 
8,000 
7,630 
7,350 
7,678 
Tax 
$1,822 
930 
1,290 
2,000 
3,080 
3,438 
4,494 
At 1966 prices it was clear that the proposed consolidat-
ion programme was highly worthwhile, especially as the farmer 
was willing to finance the work out of revenue. 
with a fairly developed farm of this sort the tax burden 
cannot be ignored. The profitability of the farm enterprise 
in 1966/67 was such that $1,800 of tax was being paid. Even 
with all the allowances for development expenditure there was 
still a taxable surplus in subsequent years. This difference 
shows up in the present worth of the extra payments by the 
farmer including tax. The ratio becomes: 
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$74,402 = 
62,300 1.19 
Internal rate of return = 32.6 per cent. 
As long as prices held, this remains most satisfactory. 
The 1967 situation 
The fall in prices in 1967 directly affected the revenue 
earning part of the proposed developments. The farmer could 
expect his receipts to fall by $2,000 from wool alone, without 
taking into account lower sale prices for surplus stock. His 
reaction has been to maintain-his expansion programme in spite 
of falling wool prices, and to cover the C!,eficiency on the 
revenue account by borrowing $4,000 from the state Advances 
Corporation to be spent on capital expenditure and spread over 
the years 1967/68 and 1968/69. The equity position of the 
farmer in 1966/67 was good and the subsequent loan was not 
large in relation to the total value of the assets. 
The loan enabled the fencing- and fertiliser programme 
to continue at roughly the levels budgeted in the 1966 plan, 
and also financed a large proportion of the stock held back 
for breeding. A proposed motor-bike purchase in 1968/69 
has been cancelled, and the construction of cattle yards 
delayed. Fertiliser levels are actually lower by about 10 
per cent on those projected. 
The financial analysis of the 1967 situation with wool 
prices at 20 cents is as follows: 
(1967 plan at 1967 prices) 
Year Total Revenue Total EX2enditure Tax 
Pre-consolidation $11,104 $5,042 $1,040 
1967/68 10,891 6,508 340 
1968/69 11,373 7,018 490 
1969/70 13,543 7,752 960 
1970/71 14,682 7,382 1,620 
1971/72 14,867 7,088 1,840 
Post-consolidation 16,212 7,416 2,460 
Return to the Nation 
$59,467 = 1.82 
32,372 
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Internal rate of return = 37.2 
Return to the Farmer 
$59,467 
- = 1. 27 47,009 
I.R.Re = 32.0 
It is clear that the fall in wool prices can be:. 
absor.ped~on this. £arm. The borrowing of further capital to 
complete the proposed programme is amply justified. The 
reasons f()r this successful outcome are the good management 
standard apparent in the cost/returns situation in 1966/67, 
the high return on extra stock on already developed farms at 
the present state of New Zealand sheep technology, and the 
favourabl.e equity position of the farmer himself. 
The property will be almost as easy to manage as before, 
as only internal transport and some cattle yards are deleted 
from the plan. It is not clear whether the correct amount 
of fertiliser is being applied for such high stocking rates. 
A small saving in fertiliser could make the budgeted plan 
considerably more profitable. On the other hand, the farmer 
can absorb the cost of somewhat higher rates of fertiliser 
application, and some other labour saving improvements as 
well, on the basis of the above analysis. 
Case 4 This case study is based on a larger farm on 
rolling to steep hill country with a programme 
of consolidation and extension of pasture development. The 
area is approximately 2,700 acres, with 1,100 acres developed 
as pasture. The owner-occupier usually has a full-time 
single man employed as well as working himself. Ewe numbers 
in 1966 were 2,400 and breeding cows numbered 71. A large 
number of wethers are kept, bringing the total number of ewe-
equivalents up to 5,011, or about 4.1 per acre. 
The farm had been taken over in 1960 with 1,800 breeding 
ewes, 90 breeding cows and a few wethers. Carrying capacity 
was then approximately 3.0 ewe equivalents per acre. Since 
a large proportion of the sheep were Cheviot crosses, several 
years were taken in the early stages of this farmer's programme 
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to re-introduce Romney blood by buying in. Fertiliser 
application was increased fairly steadily, andsomec.450 
acres of scrub was cut, burned and oversown. S,Ome sub-
division was carried out by means of electric fencing, and 
a major access track was bulldozed. In 1965/66 a fertiliser 
bin was built and 180 tons of fertiliser spread.in that an9 
the following season. A further 180 tons was spread in 
the autumn of the 1966/67 season, to give an equivalent 
dressing of 6 cwt per acre over the developed area of the 
farm for the year. The· expected spurt in production of 
pasture was taken up by increasing wethers rather than 
breeding stock. 
Th~ further projected development of the property was 
to maintain fertiliser at 3 cwt per year, carry out 70 chains 
of fencing per year, build new tracks, and over-sow about 70 
acres per year. In ad9ition a woolshed extension was 
planned for 1967/68, 2 sets of docking yards for 19,68/69, 
new cattle yards for 1969/70 and a new homestead in 1970/71. 
By 1972/73, it was hoped to have 3,200 breeding ewes, 
130 breeding cows, 1,750 wethers - in all 6,123 ewe equivalents 
at 5 ewe equivalents per acre. There would be accommodation 
for a married couple in the ownerus present house, and room 
for a single employee if necessary_ 
The financial assessment of this development plan is 
taken over the whole period from 1960/61 to 1972/73.* 
* wether lambs were at $3.50; cull ewes at $5.00; wool at 
30 cents, and weaner calves $46.00. 
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(1966 plan at 1966 prices) 
Year Total Returns Total E~enditure Tax 
Pre-development $15,300 $ 7,840 $1,640 
1961/62 13,120 7,196 790 
1962/63 22,284 13,630 1,950 
1963/64 17,256 12,698 310 
1964/65 15,694 9,118 920 
1965/66 11,308 13,938 
1966/67 25,090 15,640 21- 070 
1967/68 26,880 22,860 300 
1968/69 27,310 22,510 230 
1969/70 26,510 23,560 
1970/71 29,950 31,500 1,450 
1971/72 30,010 27,520 
Post-development 35,410 24,990 2,420 
Nation Os Viewpoint Farmer's Vie~oint 
$180,859 = 0 99 $180/859 
= 1.01 183,157 . 178,342 
Internal rate of return = 6.5 loRoR .. = 7.4 
with such a drawn-out development plan, mainly resulting 
from the change-over from Cheviots to Romneys, and the fairly 
slow rate of increase of stock since the change, this long-
term development plan does not quite break even at a 7 per 
cent interest rate. 
The 1967 Situation 
The farmer's immediate concern is to get through the 
1967/68 season 0 In fact, low wool prices had already affected 
his returns for 1966/67 when only 23 cents was received for 
wool instead of the 30 cents budgeted. In 1967/68 he has to 
consider the impact of 20 cents per lb. for his wool, anQ 
lower prices for surplus stock. His decision has been to 
retain breeding stock as planned, and to carry out certain 
improvements by taking up the balance of a State Advances 
loan given in 1966, and also drawing on his credit with the 
local stock firm. 
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The plan for over-sowing, fencing and an extension to 
the woolshed for 1967/68 has been abandoned. T.rack imp+,ove-
ments have had to be retained for management purposes. A 
small amount of scrub cutting and water reticulation improve-
ments are provided for, and $2,000 set aside for house 
improvements. The budgeted position for 1967/68 may be 
summarised as follows: 
(1967 budget at 1967 prices) 
Gross revenue 
Expenditure 
Tax allowed expenditure 
(excluding depn.) 
Capital development 
Personal 
Taxation 
Depreciation 
Balance 
$14,694 
2,000 
1,400 
100 
560 
18,754 
$16,562 
-2,192 
On top of the deficit of $2,192, a principal payment 
of $1,120 is due, and a life insurance premium of $280. 
This makes a total deficit of $3,592 for the year if deprec-
iation is omitted. The farmer hopes to meet this by 
drawing on the balance of his SeA.C. development loan and 
drawing a little on his local stock firm. 
If price conditions do not improve, then this farmer 
must find ways of overcoming this deficit permanently. On 
the revenue side there is a small increment of breeding 
stock which could be sold annually. Cattle numbers are 
stable. On the expenditure side, fertiliser could be 
reduced from 180 tons to 120 tons, a "saving" of $3,000, 
track-making and scrub cutting omitted, and the repairs 
to the house cancelled. On this basis, a small surplus 
could be budgeted. On the same basis and layout· as above, 
the result could be as follows: 
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(1967/68 stabilised plan at 1967 prices) 
Gross revenue 
Expenditure 
Tax allowed expenditure 
Capital development 
Personal 
Taxation 
Depreciation 
Balance 
$12,814 
1,400 
570 
560 
15,344 
$16,880 
+1,536 
Out of this surplus, the farmer must meet the principal 
repayment of $1120 and an insurance premium of $280. This 
leaves a balance of $136, plus the cash set aside for 
depreciation. 
Farm Profitability 1960-68 
The 1966 situation above was analysed in terms of 
1966 price levels. In point of fact, prices have fluctuated 
considerably in the e~ght years since the farm was taken 
over. The actual record of revenue and expenditure, as 
defined previously was as follows: 
Year Total Revenue 
1960/61 $13,800 
1961/62 10,408 
1962/63 170514 
1963/64 20,092 
1964/65 15,076 
1965/66 8,906 
1966/67 21,538 
1967/68 16,880 
Total EX:Qenditure 
$ 7,840 
7,196 
13,630 
12,698 
9,118 
13,938 
15,640 
11,374 
Tax 
$1,000 
100 
220 
1,240 
700 
570 
If it is assumed that the 1967/68 levels of revenue 
and expenditure will continue in the future, the present 
worth ana1ysi.s of extra revenue and El~enditure from 1960/61 
can be carried out. ' 
National Viewpoint 
$37,147 
- = 0071 52,558 
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Farmer"s Viewpoint 
$37€l47 
= 0.82 45,437 
In this case, lower prices from 1966/67 have made the 
earlier expenditure on the development of the farm uneconomic. 
The farmer"s viewpoint is slightly more favourable as the tax 
position has eased over the period concerned. 
As with case 2, this farmer has been forced to 
suspend his development programme. The programme is 
suspended before the income potential of the property 
has been realised. There is some uncertainty about this 
result as fertiliser application will probably have to be 
cut back from 3028 cwt per acre to 2.2 cwt per acre. It 
is not clear whether this fertiliser rate, and the present 
stocking rate, are sufficient to maintain good pastures and 
control second growth of bush species. 
VIa SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES 
It is useful to summarise the results in a table to 
bring out certain differences in th.e case studies ~ It 
should be noted that there are two retrospect,ive studies -
studies involving past performance ~ and two forward 
studies. The forward studies were completely reu:ised 
at 1967 prices as the farmers happened to be continuing 
with modified versions of their development planso The 
two retrospective s t.udies were on properties where develop-
ment has been suspended in the meant,ime 0 
The rates of return per $ of capital invested by 
the farmers for the two historic studies were as follows: 
Case 2 1960/61-1969/70 
National viewpoint 
Farmer viewpoint 
Case 4 1960/61-1972/73 
National viewpoint 
Farmer viewpoint 
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1966 plan at 
1966 prices 
1.38 
1.15 
0.99 
1.01 
Actual 
prices 
0.98 
1.01 
0.71 
0.82 
The plans laid down in 1966 were satisfactory in one 
case and marginal in the other. In terms of actual prices 
the impact of falling wool prices has been to lower the 
overall profitability of development to rates of return 
lower than 7 per cent. The productive assets still exist, 
however, and the farmers concerned have to consolidate their 
personal income positions in the meantime. A slightly 
higher level of capital investment in these properties 
would help national exports a little, and would give these 
farmers a scale of output which would provide a satisfactory 
level of personal income and way of life. 
The rates of return per $ of capital invested by 
the farmers for the two forward studies were as follows: 
Case 1 1966/67-1970/71 
National viewpoint 
Farmer viewpoint 
Cast 3 1966/67-1972/73 
National viewpoint 
Farmer viewpoint 
1966 plan at 
1966 prices 
1967 plan at 
1967 prices 
2.28 
1. 27 
1.82 
1. 27 
In these two cases, the expansion plans laid down in 
1966 were highly satisfactory. They were both based on 
the expansion of stock numbers on existing pastures. The 
farmers have adjusted to falling prices by effectively 
increasing their own labour input and receiving a lower 
reward for doing it. It remains highly profitable for 
these farmers to continue with their development plans, and 
there is likely to be sufficient surpluses generated to pay 
for some of the labour saving improvements originally budgeted. 
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VII. POSTSCRIPT ON THE 1966 SURVEY 
The original part of this research project was to 
investigate the profitability of 15 farm development 
programmes. In March 1967, analysis of the 15 case 
studies was completed but never published. 
The general question being studied was whether the 
nation should encourage the use of scarce resources on 
the development of steep hill coun·try. The tes·t of 
worthwhileness was given as ·the value of e}"'Portable products 
produced per $ of investment. No special weighting was 
given to a dollar of overseas exchange as compared with a 
dollar of returns earned within the country. 
The distribution of this ratio for the 15 farms, all 
production valued at 1966 prices, was as follows: 
0.80 - 0.99 2 
1.00 - 1.19 3 
1.20 - 1. 39 5 
1.40 - 1. 59 1 
1.60 1. 79 2 Mean = 1.46 
1.80 - 1.99 0 
2.00 - 2.19 0 
2.20 - 2.39 1 
2.40 - 2.59 1 
15 
Considering the group as a whole, there was an average 
expected return of exportable products of $1.46 for every $1 
of resources used. On this basis, develo·pment should clearly 
proceed. 
An alternative procedure would be to take the gross 
value over all farms of discounted exportable products, and 
express this as a proportion of the total value of extra 
goods and services drawn in. The answer ·to this calcula·tion 
is $1.33 per $ of resources - still quite satisfactory. 
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Al though further development work on the 15 properties 
could take place now that wool prices have stabilised, it 
has not been possible to investigate these plans completely. 
The four case studies were examined in detail; two of the 
properties were continuing in a modified way and two were 
suspending development. Seven other farmer.s were contacted 
by telephone. All except one of these farmers were planning 
to reduce the rate of fertiliser application. One farmer 
was still clearing scrub but the remainder had stopped such 
work. A common hedging policy to all farms was to delay 
fertiliser work from the spring to the autumn when a clearer 
idea of the finance available would be known. 
The r~le of fertiliser on these farms is not fully 
understood. The required rates for initial dressings and 
maintenance dressings are not known. The response of pasture 
to fertiliser is a complex one as the rate of stocking inter-
acts with the effects of the fertiliser. The problem in the 
past was to control the growth of secondary bush species. 
There is therefore some rate of fertiliser application and 
rate of stocking which can achieve this. More facts about 
these relationships need to be known beforefutur.e develop-
ment plans can be guaranteed to give certain results. In 
the meantime, the experience of the farmers themselves will. 
provide the best available evidence of what to do .. 
The financing of this type of development is not going 
to be as easy as before, and there will be a general reluctance 
of farmers to risk their own capital in view of uncertainties 
about the future. But the evidence of the case studies 
suggests that further prudent development will still give a 
satisfactory return on additional capital spent on development. 
On this basis, the Government might well consider credit pro-
grammes to provide capital to farmers to replace the earnings 
(and hence finance for re-investment) lost through lower wool 
prices. It should always be emphasised in this context, that 
the greatest proportion of farm investment in New Zealand 
comes from ploughed back profits, and any deterioration of 
farm incomes will soon be reflected in reduced preparations 
for future expansion. 
PUBLICA nONS 
1964 
1. The Systematic Evaluation of Development Projects, 
J. T. Ward 
2. The New Agricultural Economics Research Unit, B. P. 
Philpott 
3. Indicative Planning for the Poultry Industry in New 
Zealand, J. T. Ward 
4. The International Sugar Situation and New Zealand's 
Sugar Policy, A. R. Frampton 
5. Economic Implication of Increased Agricultural Pro-
duction, B. P. Philpott 
6. Profitability of Irrigation ill Mid-Canterbury, J. D. 
Stewart and D. A. R. Haslam 
7. Programming a Canterbury Mixed Farm, J. D. Stewart 
and P. Nuthall 
8. Economic Implications of Increased Wool Production, 
B. P. Philpott 
9. Investment Analysis for Farm Improvement, J. T. Ward 
1965 
10. Profitability of a Recommended Strategy for Develop-
ment on Two Banks Peninsula Farms, A. T. G. 
McArthur 
11. Factors Affecting Demand for Wool Textiles in New 
Zealand, B. P. Philpott 
12. The Degree of Protection accorded by Import Licensing 
to New Zealand Manufacturing Industry, P. Hampton 
13. Fluctuations in Wool Prices, 1870-1963, B. P. Philpott 
14. The Profitability of Hill Country Development-Part 1: 
Analytical Methods, J. S. Holden 
15. The Problem of Scheduling Sales of New Zealand 
Butter on the United Kingdom Market, Robert 
Townsley 
16. A Market Target for the New Zealand Dairy Industry, 
A. R. Frampton 
17. Breeding Flock Composition in Relation to Economic 
Criteria, R. J. Townsley and W. Schroder 
18. Trends in Production, Trade and Consumption of Wool 
and Wool Textiles, B. P. Philpott and D. M. Beggs 
19. Standardisation of Farm Accounts for Managerial 
Analysis, J. W. B. Guise 
20. The Use of Linear Programming in Least-cost Feed 
Compounding, N. W. Taylor 
21. The Maximisation of Revenue from New Zealand 
Sales of Butter on the United Kingdom Market-A 
Dynamic Programming Problem, R. J. Townsley 
(Reprint) 
22. The Economic Approach to Resource Development in 
New Zealand, J. T. Ward (Reprint) 
23. An Analysis of the Retail Demand for Meat in the 
United Kingdom, B. P. Philpott and M. J. Matheson 
1966 
24. The Profitability of Hill Country Development-Part 2, 
Case History Results, J. S. Holden. 
25. Strategic and Tactical Planning in International Market-
ing Policies, B. P. Philpott (Reprint) 
26. Indexes of Cost of Investment Goods 1949-50 to 
1963-4, G. C. Scott 
27. An Economic Analysis of Large-scale Land Develop-
ment for Agriculture and Forestry, J. T. Ward and E. 
D. Parkes 
28. A Review of the Argentine Beef Cattle Situation, R. J. 
Townsley and R. W. M. Johnson 
29. Aspects of Productivity and Economic Growth in New 
Zealand 1926-64, B. P. Philpott 
30. Estimates of Farm Income and Productivity in New 
Zealand 1921-65, B. P. Philpott, B. J. Ross, C. J. Mc-
Kenzie, C. A. Yandle and D. D. Hussey 
31. The Regional Pattern of the Demand for Meat in the 
United Kingdom, Mary J. Matheson and B. P. Philpott 
(Published 1967.) 
32. Long-Run Swings in Wool Prices, B. P. Philpott (In 
preparation) 
33. The Economics of Hill Country Development, J. S. 
Holden (Reprint) 
34. Report on a Survey of Farm Labour in Patangata 
COl/llty, Hawkes Bay 1965-6, D. McClatchy 
35. Programming Farm Development, G. A. G. Frengley, 
R. H. B. Tonkin and R. W. M. Johnson 
36. Productivity, Planning and the Price Mechanism in the 
New Zealand Manufacturing Industry, B. P. Philpott 
37. Some Projections of Retail Consumption in New 
Zealand, R. H. Court 
38. The Nature and Extent of the Farm Labour Shortage 
in Cheviot County, Canterbury, J. L. Morris and R. G. 
Cant 
1967 
39. Index to New Zealand Agricultural Publications, 1964, 
G. A. G. Frengley 
40. High Country Development on Molesworth, R. W. M. 
Johnson 
41. The Inter-Industry Structure of the New Zealand 
Economy, B. P. Philpott and B. J. Ross (In prepara-
tion) 
42. Statistics of Production, Trade Flows and Consumption 
of Wool and Wool-type Textiles, B. P. Philpott, H. T. 
D. Ac1and, A. J. Tairo 
43. Survey of Christchurch Consumer Attitudes to Meat, 
C. A. Yandle 
44. Fertiliser and Production on a sample of Intensive 
Sheep Farms in Southland 1953-64, R. C. Jensen and 
A. C. Lewis 
45. Computer Methods for Development Budgets, K. T. 
Sanderson and A. T. G. McArthur 
46. Budgeting Further Development on Intensive Sheep-
Farms in Southland, R. C. Jensen and A. C. Lewis 
47. The Impact of Falling Prices on Taranaki Hill-Country 
Development, R. W. M. Johnson 
OUT OF PRINT: Numbers 1, 2, 3,4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 
17,21,22 and 25. 
While stocks last, single copies of the publications listed 
above are available to interested individuals, institutions 
and firms, on application. 
